It Was Collusion, and Treason Too

 The following consists of some excerpts from the part of the Republican Led Senate Intelligence Committee's recent report that I have read at this point.  

REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE UNITED STATES SENATE

ON RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION 

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The Committee found that the Russian government engaged in an aggressive, multifaceted effort to influence, or attempt to influence, the outcome of the 2016 presidential election.

Parts of this effort are outlined in the Committee's earlier volumes on election security, social media, the Obama Administration's response to the threat, and the January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA). 

In this volume the Committee lays out its findings in detail by looking at many aspects of the counterintelligence threat posed by the Russian influence operation. For example, the Committee examined Paul Manafort' s connections to Russian influence actors...

Paul Manafort's connections to Russia and Ukraine began in approximately late 2004 with the start of his work for Oleg Deripaska and other Russia-aligned oligarchs in Ukraine. The Committee found that Deripaska conducts influence operations, frequently in countries where he has a significant economic interest. The Russian government coordinates with and directs Deripaska on many of his influence operations.

 

(U) From approximately 2004 to 2009, Manafort implemented these influence operations on behalf ofDeripaska, including a broad, multi-million dollar political influence campaign directed at numerous countries of interest to Deripaska and the Russian government. ProRussian Ukrainian oligarchs with deep economic ties to Russia also paid Manafort tens of millions of dollars and formed strong ties with Manafort independent of Deripaska.   Manafort hired and worked increasingly closely with a Russian national, Konstantin Kilimnik. Kilimnik is a Russian intelligence officer. Kilimnik became an integral part of Manafort's operations in Ukraine and Russia, serving as Manafort's primary liaison to Deripaska and eventually managing Manafort's office in Kyiv. Kilimnik and Manafort formed a close and lasting relationship that endured to the 2016 U.S. elections. and beyond. Prior to joining the Trump Campaign in March 2016 and continuing throughout his time 6n the Campaign, Manafort directly and indirectly communicated with Kilimnik, Deripaska, and the pro-Russian oligarchs in Ukraine. On numerous occasions, Manafort sought to secretly share internal Campaign information with Kilimnik.

After the election, Manafort continued to coordinate with Russian persons, particularly Kilimnik and other individuals close to Deripaska, in an effort to undertake activities on their behalf. Manafort worked with Kilimnik starting in 2016 on narratives that sou ht to undermine evidence that Russia interfered in .the 2016 U.S. election.

The Committee found that Manafort's presence on the Campaign and proximity to Trump created opportunities for Russian intelligence services to exert influence over, and acquire confidential information on, the Trump Campaign. Taken as a whole, Manafort's high level access and willingness to share information with individuals closely affiliated with the Russian intelligence services, particularly Kilimnik and associates of Oleg Deripaska, represented a grave counterintelligence threat. 

The Committee found that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian effort to hack computer networks and accounts affiliated with the Democratic Party and leak information damaging to Hillary Clinton and her campaign for president. Moscow's intent was to harm the Clinton Campaign, tarnish an expected Clinton presidential administration, help the Trump Campaign after Trump became the presumptive Republican nominee, and undermine the U.S. democratic process. 

While the GRU and WikiLeaks were releasing hacked documents, the Trump Campaign sought to maximize the impact of those leaks to aid Trump's electoral prospects. Staff on the Trump Campaign sought advance notice about WikiLeaks releases, created messaging strategies to promote and share the materials in anticipation of and following their release, and encouraged further leaks. The Trump Campaign publicly undermined the attribution of the hack-and-leak campaign to Russia and was indifferent to whether it and WikiLeaks were furthering a Russian election interference effort. 

Trump and senior Campaign officials sought to obtain advance information about WikiLeaks's planned releases through Roger Stone. At their direction, Stone took action to gain inside knowledge for the Campaign and shared his purported knowledge directly with Trump and senior Campaign offictals on multiple occasions. Trump and the Campaign believed that Stone had inside information and expressed satisfaction that Stone's information suggested more releases would be forthcoming. 

The Committee found evidence suggesting that it was the intent of the Campaign participants in the June 9, 2016 meeting, particularly Donald Trump Jr., to receive derogatory information that would be of benefit to the Campaign from a source known, at least by Trump Jr.,. to have connections to the Russian government.

 In September 2015, Trump authorized Cohen to pursue a deal in Russia through Felix Sater, a longtime business associate of Trump.  Cohen kept Trump updated on the progress of the deal. While these negotiations were ongoing, Trump made positive public comments about Putin in connection with his presidential campaign. Cohen and Sater sought to leverage Trump's comments, and subsequent comments about Trump by Putin, to advance the deal. 

By the end of 2015, Cohen reached out to the Kremlin directly to solicit the Russian government's assistance. Cohen made contact in January 2016 with a Russian Presidential Administration aide to Dmitri Peskov, a senior Kremlin official and key advisor to Putin. Cohen discussed the project in detail and reported to Trump that he had done so. 

The Committee found George. Papadopoulos used multiple avenues to pursue a face to-face meeting between Trump and President Putin. Papadopoulos believed that he was operating with the approval-or at least not the explicit disapproval-of Campaign leadership, who he kept apprised of his efforts.   The Committee further found that Papadopoulos' s efforts introduced him to several individuals that raise counterintelligence concerns, due to their associations with individuals from hostile foreign governments as well as actions these individuals undertook. 

 Here, in the clearest possible form, is the evidence of the Trump campaign's successful collusion with the Russian government to rig the 2016 Presidential election, which Donald Trump, William Barr and many others lied about under oath, and which Trump has continued to lie about hundreds of times since.  Coupled with the many occasions when Trump has engaged in actions detrimental to the United States but highly desirable for Vladimir Putin, we have a literal example of adhering to the enemy, giving them aid and comfort, i.e. treason as defined in the Constitution.  Anyone who denies that at this point is a liar or a fool, and is a participant in Trump's treason.